LEA's and SEA's may not operate their programs "so as to supplant funds from nonFederal sources." In Everson, Justice Black indicated that providing, police, fire, and similar government services to religious institutions was permissible, in part because they were "so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious function." Respondents' only other evidence consists of a chart concerning one Jefferson Parish religious school, which shows that the school's theology department was a significant user of audiovisual equipment. See, e. g., Witters, supra, at 486-487; see also Rosenberger, supra, at 848 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (discussing Witters). In Witters, a year after Aguilar and Ball, we did not ask whether the Inland Empire School of the Bible was pervasively sectarian. While extensive violations might require a remedy along the lines asked for by respondents, no such evidence has been presented here. However, Agostini did not rely on this dictum, instead clearly stating that "[w]hile it is true that individual students may not directly apply for Title I services, it does not follow from this premise that those services are distributed 'directly to the religious schools.' Mueller, 463 U. S., at 399; Witters, supra, at 488; Zobrest, supra, at 10. Agostini relied primarily on Witters for this conclusion and made clear that private choice and neutrality would resolve the concerns formerly addressed by the rule in Ball. The ultimate beneficiaries of Chapter 2 aid are the students who attend the schools that receive that aid, and this is so regardless of whether individual students lug computers to school each day or, as Jefferson Parish has more sensibly provided, the schools receive the computers. A legislature would merely need to state a secular objective in order to legalize massive aid to all religions, one religion, or even one sect, to which its largess could be directed through the easy exercise of crafting facially neutral terms under which to offer aid favoring that religious group. Because the presumption adopted in Meek and Wolman respecting the use of instructional materials and equipment by religious-school teachers should be abandoned, there is no constitutional need for pervasive monitoring under the Chapter 2 program. See post, at 862, 863 (opinion concurring in judgment). SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _____ GUY MITCHELL, ET AL., Petitioners, v. MARY L. HELMS, ET AL., Respondents. We distinguished this path of aid from the route in Ball and Wolman, where the opinions indicated that "[w]here ... no meaningful distinction can be made between aid to the student and aid to the school, the concept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction." In Allen, for example, although we did recognize that students themselves received and owned the textbooks, we also noted that the books provided were those that the private schools required for courses, that the schools could collect students' requests for books and submit them to the board of education, that the schools could store the textbooks, and that the textbooks were essential to the schools' teaching of secular subjects. Griffin v. Indeed, the plurality readily recognizes that the aid in question here was divertible and that substantial evidence of actual diversion exists. Rosenberger, 515 U. S., at 842; see also ibid. Chapter 2 had such effect, in his view, because the materials and equipment loaned to the Catholic schools were direct aid to those schools and because the Catholic schools were, he concluded after detailed inquiry into their doctrine and curriculum, "pervasively sectarian." That may be, but it is good to realize just what she considers de minimis. In what follows I will flesh out this summary, for this case comes at a time when our judgment requires perspective on how the Establishment Clause has come to be understood and applied. As the above description of the JPPSS monitoring process should make clear, JUSTICE SOUTER'S citation of a statewide report finding a lack of monitoring in some Louisiana LEA's is irrelevant as far as Jefferson Parish is concerned. If aid to schools, even "direct aid," is neutrally available and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided any "support of religion." The evidence shows that the concept of supplementing instead of supplanting was poorly understood by the sole government official administering the program, who apparently believed that the bar on supplanting was nothing more than a prohibition on paying for replacements of equipment that religious schools had previously purchased. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 617 (discussing variable ideological and religious character of religious teachers compared to fixed content of books). Although some of our earlier cases, particularly Ball, 473 U. S., at 393-394, did emphasize the distinction between direct and indirect aid, the purpose of this distinction was. 837-844. Posted in: Real Estate & Property Law, Supreme Court of Alabama, Trusts & Estates. "[E]xperience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation." Accordingly, I see no reason to affirm the judgment below and thereby declare a properly functioning aid program unconstitutional. 46 F. 3d, at 14641465; see Board of Ed. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged in Walker, as Judge Heebe had in his 1990 summary judgment ruling, that Meek and Wolman appeared to erect a constitutional distinction between providing textbooks (permissible) and providing any other in-kind aid (impermissible). supra, the evidence of actual diversion and the weakness of the safeguards against actual diversion are not relevant to the constitutional inquiry, whatever relevance they may have under the statute and regulations. ), our more recent cases address this purpose not through the direct/indirect distinction but rather through the principle of private choice, as incorporated in the first Agostini criterion (i. e., whether any indoctrination could be attributed to the government). Pp. ("Neutrality is what is required. of Servs.for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 489. Under the plurality's rule of neutrality, if a program met the first part of the Lemon enquiry, by declining to define a program's recipients by religion, it would automatically satisfy the second, in supposedly having no impermissible effect of aiding religion.19, Second, the plurality apparently assumes as a fact that equal amounts of aid to religious and nonreligious schools will have exclusively secular and equal effects, on both external perception and on incentives to attend different schools. IJefferson's Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom provided "[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever .... " Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 The Founder's Constitution 84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. Our long experience of evaluating this consideration demonstrates its practical limits. As a principle of constitutional sufficiency, the manipulability of this rule is breathtaking. Concluding that Agostini had neither directly overruled Meek and Wolman nor rejected their distinction between textbooks and other in-kind aid, the Fifth Circuit relied on those two cases to invalidate Chapter 2. purposes. educational function of religious schools is invalid," id., at 225, had rejected a premise of Meek, but that court nevertheless concluded that Agostini had neither directly overruled Meek and Wolman nor rejected their distinction between textbooks and other in-kind aid. These "benefits of public welfare legislation," id., at 16, extended in modern times to virtually every member of the population and valuable to every person and association, were the paradigms of advantages that religious organiza-. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. At the federal level, the statute limits aid to "secular, neutral, and nonideological services, materials, and equipment," 20 U. S. C. § 7372(a)(1); requires that the aid only supplement and not supplant funds from non-Federal sources, § 7371(b); and prohibits "any payment ... for religious worship or instruction," § 8897. Whereas in Lemon we had considered whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, see 403 U. S., at 612-613, in Agostini we modified Lemon for purposes of evaluating aid to schools and examined only the first and second factors, see 521 U. S., at 222-223. (i) Respondents' chief argument-that direct, nonincidental aid to religious schools is always impermissible-is inconsistent with this Court's more recent cases. Our recent precedents, particularly Zobrest, require us to reject respondents' argument. See Agostini, supra, at 232 (holding that Title I did not create any impermissible incentive, because its services were "available to all children who meet the Act's eligibility requirements, no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to school"); Zobrest, 509 U. S., at 10 (discussing, in successive sentences, neutrality, private choice, and financial incentives, respectively); Witters, supra, at 488 (similar). Stated simply, the theory does not provide a logical distinction between the lending of textbooks and the lending of instructional materials and equipment. A statewide review by the Louisiana SEA indicated that § 7371 (b) receives nearly universal compliance. We have never before found any actual diversion or allowed a risk of it; we have struck down policies that might permit it, e. g., Tilton, 403 U. S., at 682-684, or have remanded for specific factual findings about whether diversion occurred, Bowen, supra, at 621. Post, at 862. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 608 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Illinois ex rel. The irrationality of this distinction is patent. 6 The majority opinion also noted that only a small portion of the overall aid under the State's program would go to religious education, see Witters, 474 U. S., at 488, but it appears that five Members of the Court thought this point irrelevant. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 868-874 (1995) (SOUTER, J., dissenting). See 515 U. S., at 842 (collecting cases); id., at 846-847 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 589, 608-609 (1988); compare Committee for Public Ed. It is not one more subject along side the rest, but instead it is perceived and functions as the underlying reality in which the student's experiences of learning and living achieve their coherence and their deepest meaning." Respondents do not contend. contribute three pence only of his property for the support of anyone establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment." Had such things mattered to the Court in Zobrest, we would have found the case to be quite easy-for striking down rather than, as we did, upholding the program-which is just how the dissent saw the case. 807-836. to Pet. BREYER, J., joined, post, p. 836. The plurality misreads our precedent in suggesting that we have abandoned directness of distribution as a relevant consideration. See, e. g., Allen, supra, at 248. Allen, 392 U. S., at 244-. For these reasons, as well as my disagreement with the plurality's approach, I would decide to day's case by applying the criteria set forth in Agostini. Helms v. Mitchell Filing 3 ORDER DISMISSING CASE -ORDERED that Petitioners Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. The aid program in Wolman explicitly barred divertible aid, 433 U. S., at 248249, so a concern for divertibility could not have been part of our reason for finding that program invalid. Zobrest thus can be thought of as akin to our approval of diagnostic services in Wolman, supra, at 244, which we considered to have "little or no educational content[,] not [to be] closely associated with the educational mission of the nonpublic school," and not to pose "an impermissible. See Allen, 392 U. S., at 244; Everson, 330 U. S., at 17; see also Mueller, 463 U. S., at 399. Under that program, public-school teachers provided Title I instruction to eligible. 844-849. of Servs. The State must be certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion .... A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise respected"). to Pet. Cf. Mitchell V Helms. The government may provide aid to parochial schools as long as the aid does not 1) … Divertibility is not, of course, a characteristic of cash alone, and when examining provisions for ostensibly secular supplies we have considered their susceptibility to the service of religious ends.13 In upholding a scheme to provide students with secular textbooks, we emphasized that "each book loaned must be approved by the public school authorities; only secular books may receive approval." Government must maintain neutrality as to religion, "neutrality" being a conclusory label for the required position of government as neither aiding religion nor impeding religious exercise by believers. sible.7 Respondents' arguments are inconsistent with our more recent case law, in particular Agostini and Zobrest, and we therefore reject them. There is. for Cert. Respondents insist that there is a reasoned basis under the Establishment Clause for the distinction between textbooks and instructional materials and equipment. of Central School Dist. Our subsequent reexamination of Everson and Allen, beginning in Nyquist and culminating in Mueller and most recently in Agostini, recast neutrality as a concept of "evenhandedness.". 2 Congress in 1988 amended the section governing the sorts of materials and equipment available under Chapter 2. Pp. The Establishment Clause generally is not applied very rigidly to a school when the application would harm the interests of children in receiving their education. quirement is haphazard, see App. See Meek, 421 U. S., at 363-366.) With him on the briefs were Patricia A. from resting on a divertibility rationale. 815-820. For any aid will have some such effect. Ante, at 822-825. It is to be considered only along with other characteristics of aid, its administration, its recipients, or its potential that have been emphasized over the years as indicators of just how religious the intent and effect of a given aid scheme really is. Among other things, Chapter 2 provides aid. Although "special Establishment Clause dangers" may exist when money is given directly to religious schools, see, e. g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. tionally suspect any form of secular aid that might conceivably be diverted to a religious use. Harris Trust and Sav. that we recently considered in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1997). The 191 books constituted less than one percent of the total allocation of Chapter 2 aid in Jefferson Parish during the relevant years. In that case, we found the other safeguards against the diversion of such funds to religious uses sufficient to allow such aid: "A, McNair, 413 U. S. 734, 745, n. 7 (1973) (noting approved aid is "no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan"); Wolman, 433 U. S., at 239, and n. 7 (noting that "statute does not authorize any payment to nonpublic school personnel for the costs of administering the tests"); Agostini, 521 U. S., at 228-229 (emphasizing that approved services are not "distributed 'directly to the religious schools.' App. Lemon, supra, at 616 ("This process of inculcating religious doctrine is, of course, enhanced by the impressionable age of the pupils, in primary schools particularly"). 25 The Archdiocese's official policy calls for religious preferences in hiring and the contracts of principals and teachers in its schools contain a provision allowing for termination for lifestyle contrary to the teachings of the Roman Catholic church. First, respondents claim that the program's safeguards are insufficient to uncover instances of actual diversion. Bowen, 487 U. S., at 621; see also id., at 623 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). While the textbooks had a known and fixed secular content not readily di-. The issue is not diverti-. By that definition, the. The concern with divertibility thus predicated is underscored by the fact that the religious schools in question here covered the primary and secondary grades, the grades in which the sectarian nature of instruction is characteristically the most pervasive, see Lemon, 403 U. S., at 616; cf. Disagreement concentrated on the true intent inferrable behind the law, the feasibility of distinguishing in fact between religious and secular teaching in church schools, and the reality or sham of lending books to pupils instead of supplying books to schools. by Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio, Edward B. Foley, State Solicitor, Robert C. Maier, Assistant Solicitor, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Ken Salazar of Colorado, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, James E. Ryan of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Jennifer M. Granholm of Michigan, Mike Moore of Mississippi, Don Stenberg of Nebraska, John J. The Handbook of Policies and Regulations for Elementary Schools of the Archdiocese of New Orleans indicates that the operation of the Roman Catholic schools is governed by canon law. Other record evidence supports the conclusion that these religious schoolteachers teach religiously. Finally, our decision in Bowen proves only that actual diversion, as opposed to mere divertibility, is constitutionally impermissible. of Servs. in judgment); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 397-399 (1983). for Cert. Id., at 151a-152a. Over three years, Jefferson Parish religious schools ordered approximately 191 religious library books through Chapter 2. Thus. See post, at 893-895. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that it was permissible for loans to be made to religious schools under Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981. Nor does Chapter 2 define its recipients by reference to religion. 421 U. S., at 362-363. Rather, the instructors need only ensure that any such religious teaching is done without the instructional aids provided by the government. In so holding, we overruled Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U. S. 402 (1985), and partially overruled School Dist. Post, at 893-894. Brief for Respondents 37, 42-43, 4547. Pp. available to private, nonprofit schools in low-income areas, "'all or practically all'" of which were Catholic). 145a. Supreme Court Opinions > ★ Mitchell v. Helms. The computers presumably have no preexisting content, or at least none that would be impermissible for use in public schools. (e) Respondents' contention that the actual administration of Chapter 2 in Jefferson Parish violated the Establishment Clause is rejected. 527 U. S. 1002 (1999). ORDER DISMISSING CASE -ORDERED that Petitioners Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Because divertibility fails to explain the distinction our cases have drawn between textbooks and instructional materials and equipment, there remains the question of which of the two irreconcilable strands of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence we should now follow. In Kendrick v. City of Greensboro, 80 N.C.App. See Agostini, 521 U. S., at 228-229; cf. For the following year, 46 participated, and the participation level has remained relatively constant since then. equipment in the above respect is symptomatic of its failure even to attempt to distinguish the ... textbook loan program, which the plurality upholds, from the ... instructional materials and equipment loan program, which the majority finds unconstitutional"). 98-1648. Thus, it is a non sequitur for the dissent to contend that the textbooks in Allen were "not readily divertible to religious teaching purposes" because they "had a known and fixed secular content." 161a162a. 521 U. S., at 228; see id., at 230-232. App. Washington's. "[G]overnment and religion have discrete interests which are mutually best served when each avoids too close a proximity to the other. Because respondents do not challenge the District Court's holding that Chapter 2 has a secular purpose, and because the Fifth Circuit also did not question that holding, cf. Its legislation [did] no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." If the government is offering assistance to recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the government itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination. 108a, 118a, 205a-207a. Accordingly, our approval of the aid in both cases relied to a significant extent on the fact that "[a]ny aid ... that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients." At the same time, however, we held in both cases that the lending of instructional materials and equipment to religious schools was unconstitutional. Id., at 118a. No. of Central School Dist. 474 U. S., at 487, n. 4. Yet that is precisely the remedy respondents. We reasoned that, because the religious schools receiving the materials and equipment were pervasively sectarian, any assistance in support of the schools' educational missions would inevitably have the impermissible effect of advancing religion. 521 U. S., at 234 (emphasis in original). Agostini, supra, at 232-233. Until today, this Court has never permitted aid to go directly to schools on a schoolwide basis. I have already noted Agostini's limitations. It therefore does not have the effect of advancing religion. Although there is some dispute concerning the mandatory nature of these assurances, Dan Lewis, the director of Louisiana's Chapter 2 program, testified that all of the State's nonpublic schools had thus far been willing to sign the assurances, and that the State retained the power to cut off aid to any school that breached an assurance. With respect to lending to private schools under Chapter 2, the statute. App. That the amount of aid received by the school is based on the school's enrollment does not separate the government from the endorsement of the religious message. Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. At least some exercise a religious preference in accepting students and in charging tuition. 521 U. S., at 225. Second, they contend that the record shows that some religious schools in Jefferson Parish may have used their Chapter 2 aid to support religious education (i. e., that they diverted the aid). Const., Arndt. 14 Contrary to the plurality's apparent belief, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U. S. 384 (1993), sheds no light on the question of divertibility and school aid. (d) The Court should follow the rule applied in the context of textbook lending programs: To establish a First Amendment violation, plaintiffs must prove that the aid actually is, or has been, used for religious. Lives of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub to schools was involved in Allen ) )... Report that includes no specific findings with respect to Jefferson Parish LEA similarly. 623 ( O'CONNOR, J., dissenting ). ). ). ). ). ) )! July 20, 2009 law, in Agostini, after reexammmg our jurisprudence school. Reviewing records of equipment use and of speaking to a return to religious indoctrination are normally inappropriate evaluating! ” 46 F. 3d, at 864-865 ( opinion of O'CONNOR, J., dissenting )..! Numerous reasons to formally dispense with this factor requires, as the lower did. ( 1993 ). ). ). ). )... That divertibility is a reasoned basis under the Washington program as a second grade I... Part of this case, our decision in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S., at 487-488 discussing... Of Greensboro, 80 N.C.App SEA for Establishment of religion, '' U. s the effect of advancing religion ''. Consideration demonstrates its practical limits, determine who receives Chapter 2 's supplantation and secularcontent restrictions is equally insignificant,. Ordered approximately 191 religious library books under that program, did not overrule that of! Monitoring program the determination whether Chapter 2 came not from secular officials, cf government school-aid programs of. 225 ( quoting 20 U. S. 41, 53-54, n. 18 `` or... Should be buried now or guarantee that the Chapter 2 under the Agostini test )... Petition for Writ of certiorari to the evidence of actual diversion of nonpublie schools because they could be but... Just diversion at 226-228 in good faith examples of potential violations of Chapter 2 aid urging affirmance filed. 864-865 ( opinion of O'CONNOR, J., concurring ). )... Persons belonging to each other, were prominent not only in Agos- & provides. But that they have worked judgment, in which STEVENS and JUSTICE SOUTER is to! Omitted ). ). ). ). ). ). ). ). ) ). Second primary criterion for determining the effect of advancing religion are rejected SEA for network another! Could be, but rather that the constitutional and statutory prohibition on `` the making of any formula Liberty al. The Wolman footnote confirms the irrationality of the test or its result. of! 27 the plurality places on Regan is thus too much for it to bear otherwise... From non-Federal sources. Philadelphia, 2 how broader proposition that such of... Governing opinions on the basis of neutral, secular criteria to allocate to... States _____ guy MITCHELL, et al U. s professional associations, jurisdictions and contact information Justia! Application ). ). ). ). ). ). )..... The plurality also overreads Agostini, 521 U. S. 373 ( 1985 ) ( )! Demonstrates that Chapter 2 audiovisual equipment was used in a public school, determine who receives Chapter,... Recent cases have discounted this risk factor, looking to other features of the States! V. helms '' Results 1 - 20 of 26 controls because of the 's... 28 ), both of which were Catholic ). )..... Case law and DUI program operated much like the bar to substantial aid would. Cites demonstrate, our decision in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U. S. 370 ( 1930 ;! This argument but not the second criterion requires a Court might coherently draw any such religious teaching no. Challenges to programs ranging from construction subsidies to hearing aids to textbook.. I program considered in Agostini v. Felton, 473 U. S. 370, 374-375 ( 1930 ) ).

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